Abstract-A vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) (dis)charging strategy can provide charging plans for gridable electric vehicles (GEVs), aiming to offload the heavy power loads from the electric power system. However, designing an efficient online V2V (dis)charging strategy to achieve optimal energy utilization is still an open issue. In this paper, we propose a semi-distributed online V2V (dis)charging strategy at a swapping station based on price control. Specifically, based on the electricity price control strategy, GEVs are motivated to contribute to a V2V energy transaction due to expected high revenue for discharging GEVs and low cost for charging GEVs. The Oligopoly game and Lagrange duality optimization techniques are exploited to address the associated optimal V2V (dis)charging strategies. Simulation results are presented to demonstrate the performance of the proposed V2V (dis)charging strategy.
I. INTRODUCTION
There has been a growing interest in electric vehicles (EVs) as means for sustainable and eco-friendly transportation systems [1] , [2] . EVs, partly (or fully) refueled with electricity, have great potential to save thousands of dollars for drivers over the vehicle lifetime, e.g., a TESLA Model S, a pioneer retail battery EV produced by TESLA Motors, costs $3, 492 when 100, 000 miles are driven, while a traditional gasolinefueled premium sedan costs $17, 727 [3] . In addition, EVs powered by electricity produce no emissions and thus cut down the overall environment pollution (e.g., greenhouse gas emissions). However, the high penetration of EVs will lead to overload charging problems, especially for fast EV charging as it requires much higher power than the regular charging.
For the most common fast charging strategies, EVs are connected to the power grid to obtain energy via charging stations, i.e., grid-to-vehicle (G2V). However, with high EV charging demands, the power grid is subject to an overload situation, resulting in failure of power supply. Thus, it is necessary to explore more efficient and economical charging means for EVs. Due to the equipped bidirectional chargers on EVs, the energy can be not only drawn from the power grid with the plug-in function via G2V, but also delivered back to the grid from EVs, i.e., discharging through vehicle-to-grid (V2G). The EVs with bidirectional chargers are referred to This research work is financially supported by Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada Collaborative Research and Development Grants, Canada. In addition, parts of this paper, specifically Sections I, IV.A, and V.A, were made possible by NPRP grant # NPRP 4-1293-2-513 from the Qatar National Research Fund (a member of Qatar Foundation).
as gridable EVs (GEVs) [4] . Hence, vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) charging can be performed through this interaction among GEVs, i.e., energy can be directly transferred from GEVs to the other GEVs at an aggregator (e.g., swapping stations) [4] , to offload the heavy power demands from the power grid for overload avoidance. Through V2V, the charging efficiency of GEVs can be greatly enhanced, with simple infrastructure requirements and small power losses.
To the best of our knowledge, little attention has been paid to investigate (dis)charging coordination strategies for a V2V scenario. Different from the conventional charging strategies, a V2V strategy, besides coordinating charging for a set of GEVs, it should motivate discharging of another set of GEVs, such that demand and supply are matched. In this paper, we propose a semi-distributed GEV (dis)charging strategy in smart grid for a V2V scenario at a swapping station based on price control. Specifically, based on the electricity price control strategy, GEVs are motivated to contribute to a V2V energy transaction due to expected high revenue for discharging GEVs and low cost for charging GEVs. Furthermore, the proposed strategy deals with mobile GEVs (which is the case for electric taxis, for instance), and hence we account for range anxiety in the problem formulation, which is the tension between the GEV travel cost 1 and the battery energy level. The (dis)charging strategy is modeled as a single-period Oligopoly game with one product [5] , i.e., electric energy, with competition among GEVs to decide the electricity price and the (dis)charging power of GEVs, in the price decision making step. Based on this determined price, (dis)charging decisions are modeled as a convex optimization problem so as to maximize discharging revenues or minimize charging costs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The related work is reviewed in Section II. The system model is presented in Section III. In Sections IV and V, the coordinated V2V (dis)charging problem is formulated and solved. Section VI demonstrates the performance of the proposed strategy through simulations. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK There have been many studies on coordinated charging strategies of EVs (i.e., G2V). For example, the coordinated strategies in [6] and [7] coordinate the charging duration and rates of multiple EVs to improve the total energy utilization of the power system. However, the high penetration levels of GEV charging demands can significantly affect the power system leading to voltage and frequency fluctuations [8] . Besides, the deployed charging stations for fast charging are expensive [4] . Hence, more efficient and cheaper charging means should be investigated.
Due to bi-directional chargers deployed in GEVs, GEVs can in turn supply energy to the grid, i.e., V2G, to help regulating voltage and frequency fluctuations in the power grid. For instance, in [9] and [10] , GEVs can act as a smart storage device to provide fast and accurate response for frequency and spinning reserves for voltage and frequency regulations. More importantly, energy can be transferred among GEVs at swapping stations, i.e., V2V charging as discussed in [4] . V2V transaction provides an efficient charging method, through offloading charging demands from the power system to GEVs with excess energy. In addition, swapping stations are much cheaper than charging stations, however with small transmission and power losses. Therefore, through V2V transactions, the charging efficiency of GEVs can be improved.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
The proposed V2V strategy should provide an online coordination for GEV (dis)charging. Hence, it relies on realtime information exchange among vehicles and the swapping station. Real-time information includes price control signal and (dis)charging decisions. Such information can be exchanged through a heterogeneous wireless network infrastructure that integrates both cellular networks and vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs) [12] .
The cellular networks provide large coverage area through a set of base stations (BSs), however, with high cost and high congestion for other cellular services [13] . On the other hand, VANETs enable vehicle-to-road side unit (RSU) communications (i.e., V2R communications) and vehicle-to-vehicle communications (i.e., V2V communications 2 ) by deploying much cheaper RSUs along roads and equipping vehicles with onboard communication facilities (e.g., on-board units (OBUs)). Yet, VANETs suffer from intermittent connections among vehicles and RSUs due to the short-range V2V and V2R communications. Hence, by integrating both networks, the heterogeneous wireless network can leverage the advantages of both networks and overcome their limitations.
In this section, first we introduce a heterogeneous wireless network-enhanced V2V charing architecture. Then, the GEV mobility and (dis)charging models are discussed. Finally, we propose a price control model for the (dis)charging strategy. Fig. 1 shows the components of the proposed heterogeneous wireless network-enhanced V2V charing architecture, consist-2 Note that, in this paper, the term V2V is used in two different contexts, one for VANET communications among vehicles and the other for energy transfer among EVs. ing of a swapping station, RSUs, a BS of the cellular network, and GEVs. A swapping station represents the aggregator unit for V2V fast (dis)charging of GEVs. The swapping station does not hold any energy, but rather sets electricity prices for (dis)charging GEVs for supply and demand matching. Time is partitioned into periods with equal duration τ . At the beginning of every period, price decisions are made at the swapping station based on the collected GEV (dis)charging profiles for the coming period.
A. Heterogeneous Wireless Network-Enhanced V2V Charing
RSUs are deployed along the roads and capable of collecting the GEV (dis)charging information (i.e., (dis)charging profiles of GEVs) through V2R transmissions. Besides, cellular network BSs also support the wireless communications between the BS and portable transceivers in GEVs. In addition, RSUs and BSs are wiredly connected to the swapping station and can relay the collected GEV profiles to the swapping station for price calculations. Thereafter, when any RSU/BS obtains the price control signal from the swapping station, it can relay the received price signal to GEVs via R2V and V2V or cellular network transmissions.
Consider a set of mobile GEVs, denoted as V. GEVs may go for (dis)charging when moving on their ways, which is the case for electric taxis for instance. Consider that all GEVs have the same battery capacity, C. Two network interfaces (i.e., for cellular network and VANET) are equipped on each GEV. For the uplink of GEVs, the real-time GEV information can be either delivered to RSUs through multi-hop V2V and V2R transmissions or uploaded to the BS via cellular network. Similarly, for GEV downlink, the price control signal can be transmitted to GEVs via the heterogeneous network. Based on the received price control signal, the (dis)charging decisions are made through competition among GEVs, while considering each respective range anxiety. The (dis)charging decision of GEV v is the (dis)charging load/rate at the swapping station in period k (denoted as P v,k ). In addition, the GEV (dis)charging decisions are in turn delivered to swapping stations via the heterogeneous wireless network.
Define the set of candidate GEVs with discharging supply as S ∈ V and the set of candidate GEVs with charging demands as D ∈ V. For GEV d with charging demand, the charging load is defined as P d,k , where d ∈ D; and for GEV s with discharging supply, the discharging load is P s,k , where s ∈ S.
B. GEV Mobility Model
Consider that GEVs move along the roads in the studied area. The mobility of each GEV can be described by two random variables (V, J) [14] , where V represents the GEV velocity which takes two possible state values (i.e., a lower velocity v L and a higher velocity v H ). On the other hand, J is the average time spent on each velocity state.
C. GEV (Dis)charing Models 1) GEV Charging Models:
When a mobile GEV needs to be charged, the charging load of GEV d (∈ D) in period k, i.e., P d,k , should be within a certain range due to the GEV charger output power constraint, i.e.,
where P max d,k is the predefined discharging load bound of P d,k [6] . The total load of GEVs with charging demands
2) GEV Discharging Models: For supplied GEVs, the discharging power P s,k is bounded by the predefined charging load bound P max s,k due to the charger power constraint [15] ,
Similar to the charging case, the total supply of discharging GEVs P k S in period k at the swapping station is
D. Electricity price model
As shown in Fig. 2 , based on the collected GEV charging capabilities and discharging requirements (i.e., possible maximum power demand P D and maximum power supply P S ), the swapping station specifies the electricity price u. Two cases can be distinguished for price decision:
• High demand case: If the collected P D is larger than P S , the electricity price is determined based on the supply side, u = a − bP k S , where a and b are the positive coefficients of the linear function of price [11] . In this case, some GEVs with charging demands may be blocked, i.e., some GEVs may have P d,k = 0. Hence, eventually, supply and demand matching is satisfied at the swapping station, as will explained in the next section.
• Surplus supply case: If P S is no less than P D , the electricity price is determined based on the demand side, u = a − bP k D . In this case, some GEVs with discharging capabilities may not participate in the V2V transaction (due to low revenue), i.e., some GEVs may have P s,k = 0. Again, eventually, supply and demand matching is satisfied at the swapping station, as will explained in the next section.
After the swapping station has determined the electricity price, a price control signal is delivered to GEVs via the heterogeneous wireless communication network. Based on the received electricity price, GEVs will make their (dis)charging decisions to obtain either less charging cost or more discharging revenues, while considering their range anxieties. Here, in the first stage, price making is calculated at the swapping station in a centralized manner; while the (dis)charging decisions are done at vehicles in a distributed way. Hence, our strategy is as a semi-distributed one.
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, the power balance constraint at the swapping station and (dis)charging load constraints of GEVs are presented. Then, the travel costs of GEVs are calculated.
A. Balance constraint at the swapping station
In order to implement (dis)charging control for GEVs (dis)charging, the power constraint of the swapping station should be first captured. For a V2V transaction, the basic power constraint is the power balance equation among GEV chargers, i.e., at the swapping station, the total charging power should be balanced with the total discharging power. For the set of GEVs with discharging supply (i.e., s ∈ S) and the set of GEVs with charging demands (i.e.,
where η s (∈ (0, 1]) is the discharging efficiency of the charger for all the GEV suppliers; while for all the demanders, η d (∈ (0, 1]) is the charging efficiency of the charger [4] . Note that, for the high demand case, some GEVs can have P d,k = 0, i.e., blocked due to power shortage. For the surplus supply case, some GEVs will have P s,k = 0, i.e., not participate in the V2V transaction due to inappropriate price.
B. GEV Charging Constraints
During a charging period, the charging energy of each GEV should be limited by its battery-capacity C, and the battery should not be depleted on the way to the swapping station,
where E init d,k is the initial energy stored in GEV d in period k, and P d,k cost is the travel cost for charging in period k for GEV d (to be explained in Subsection IV-D). The duration of each period is a hours. For instance, if we consider a 15-minutes duration for each period, we have a = 0.25. Consider this duration to be the same for all GEVs. The charging cost c d,k for GEV d with charging power
where u k is the energy price, as set by the swapping station.
C. GEV Discharging Constraints
During a discharged period, the discharging energy of each GEV should be limited by its battery capacity C, and the battery should not be depleted on the way and failed to be discharged. In addition, after discharging, GEV s should keep a minimum amount of energy C s at its battery to guarantee the expected energy required to complete its own journey, after period k. Hence, we have
where E init s,k is the initial energy stored in GEV s in period k. P s,k cost is the travel cost for discharging in period k for GEV s (to be discussed in Subsection IV-D). The discharging cost c s,k for GEV s with charging power P s,k in period k has three components, namely, travel cost, energy discharge cost, and battery wear cost for GEV s,
where u s is the price at which GEV s purchased its stored energy. The discharging cost, W s = e 1 (aη s P s,k )
2 + e 2 (aη s P s,k ) + e 3 represents the quadratic battery wear cost function of the discharging GEVs [15] , where e 1 , e 2 , and e 3 are the coefficients of the function with e 1 , e 2 , e 3 ≥ 0. Hence, the revenue R s,k of GEV s is defined as
(10)
D. Travel Cost for (Dis)Charging GEV
The travel cost P v,k cost for GEV v to be (dis)charged in period k should consist of two parts. On one hand, with different locations for different GEVs, one part of the travel cost is due to the travel distance to the swapping station. On the other hand, the travel cost is also caused by the transmission delay for GEV v through the wireless network, while waiting for information delivery as required by the strategy. Based on the discussed mobility model in Subsection III-B, similar to [14] , the transmission delay is in a far smaller time scale (say seconds). Hence, we consider the former part as travel cost, i.e., due to the travel distance to the swapping station.
The traveling path for GEV v to the swapping station in period k can be calculated by GPS based on the shortest path algorithm [16] , and the path length is l v,k . Based on l v,k , the travel cost for GEV v in period k in terms of energy is denoted as P C(l v,k ), where P C(·) is a linear non-decreasing function to measure the impact of travel distance on the travel cost [12] ,
V. THE COORDINATED V2V (DIS)CHARGING STRATEGY
In this section, we first formulate the V2V (dis)charging coordination problem. Using the Oligopoly game and Lagrange duality, the optimal decentralized solutions are derived.
A. V2V (Dis)Charging Optimization Problems
Taking account of both the GEV discharging capabilities and charging demands and (dis)charging price, the (dis)charging strategy can be modeled as an Oligopoly game and a convex optimization problem in two cases:
• High Demand Case: When P S is less than P D , as the former case discussed in Section III-D, the problem is solved in two steps. The first one is a decision making step where the electricity price is determined based on the supply side, P k S , (i.e., Eq. (4)). The supplying GEVs compete for energy discharge based on an Oligopoly game, to maximize the discharging revenues as
The problem constraints are according to (3), (8)- (10) . Given the optimal price u * k , the supplied energy from GEV s is expressed as P *
The second step is a charging decision making one where based on the specified price u * k from the solution of (12), the GEVs with discharging demands aim to minimize their charging cost as
The constraints are according to (1) , (2), (5)-(7).
• Surplus Supply Case: When P S is no less than P D , the electricity price is determined based on the demand side, P k D (i.e., (2)) as discussed in Section III-D, and the problem is solved in two steps. In the price decision making step, the GEVs with charging demands compete for energy charging based on the Oligopoly game, to minimize charging costs
The constraints are according to (1), (6), (7) . Given the optimal price u * k , the demanded energy by GEV d is given
In the discharging decision making step, based on the specified price, the GEVs with discharging supply aim to maximize revenues, that is 3)-(5), (8)-(10) .
(15)
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B. The solutions of the proposed problems
In this section, we derive the solution of problems ( (12)- (15)) to obtain the coordinated V2V (dis)charging strategy for the two cases discussed above.
High Demand Case: When the available energy supply is less than the demand, the V2V charging problem can be solved in two steps.
1) Price Decision Making:
The curve is given by (4) . Denote U as the price such that F (U ) = 0. In addition, F (.) is twice continuously differentiable, strictly decreasing, and concave on (0, U ).
To solve (12), we take two supplying GEVs i and j as the simplest example to illustrate the solution approach [5] . GEVs i and j can choose supply functions at the same time. For each GEV, it first maximizes its own revenue based on the power supplied by the other GEV. For example, given F j (u k ) as the supplied power of GEV j at price u k , the supplied power of GEV i,
, since the total supplied power is a function of price u k , i.e., F (u k ). Then, i aims to find its revenue-maximizing price along its demand curve by solving max
, is equal to c i,k as given in (9) . If u k satisfies that the first order of revenue is equal to zero, i.e.,
and u k also satisfies F j ′′ (u k ) ≥ 0, then u k is a local revenuemaximizing for GEV i. Similarly for GEV j, if the first order of the revenue is equal to zero, and the second order
is no less than zero, then u k is a local revenue-maximizing for GEV j. By extending F i (.) and F j (.) linearly over [0, U ), u k * can be found as a global revenue-maximum for each GEV, and this global maximum solution is unique due to the strictly decreasing demand function [5] . Similarly, the solution approach can be extended to the case with a group of GEVs.
2) Charging Decision Making: Given the energy price u * k , in order to minimize the overall charging cost for the GEVs with charging demands, we solve (13) , which presents a convex objective function and linear constraints. Using the Lagrange duality [17] , we can obtain a decentralized optimal solution for (13) . The basic idea is to take the constraints of (13) into account by argumenting the objective function with a weighted sum of the constraint functions. We further defined the Lagrangian L(.) associated with (13) as
where (13), i.e.,
Surplus Supply Case: In this case, the available energy supply is not less than the demand. The solutions of (14) and (15) are obtained in a similar approach to the high demand case of (12) and (13), respectively.
In the price decision making step, the energy price is obtained via competition among the GEVs with charging demands to minimize the charging cost. Hence, (14) is modeled as a single-step Oligopoly game problem with all linear constraints. By solving this Oligopoly problem (by a similar approach as explained for (12)), the energy price can be obtained. Thereafter, in the discharging decision making step, based on the calculated energy price, (15) resumes to maximizing the discharging revenues of the supplied GEVs, which is a convex optimization problem with all linear constraints. This optimization problem can be easily solved in a decentralized manner based on Lagrange duality (as explained for (13)). We omit mathematical details due to space limitations.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS
In this section, we use a custom simulator built in Matlab to evaluate the performance of the proposed V2V (dis)charging strategy. The performances include: 1) discharging power and revenues of supplied GEVs; and 2) charging power and costs of GEVs with charging demands at the swapping station.
A. Simulation Setup
We set the GEV battery capacity to 60KWh according to the TESLA Model S [3]. The charging period is set to 15 min for all GEVs. The original remaining energy in a GEV is uniformly chosen in [10, 60] KWh. VISSIM [18] is utilized to simulate a vehicular network with the region of 6000m * 2800m. At the beginning of the simulation, vehicles enter the region from the preseted entries (e.g., 9 entries at the ends of roads), following a Poisson process at a rate ζ (e.g., ζ = 2500 vehicle/hour/entry). After a certain duration t ζ (e.g., 240s), the vehicle pushing-in stops. The information (e.g., locations, velocities, etc) of vehicles can be recorded at the end of every simulation step (e.g., 0.2s) in the recorded trace files. In addition, a set of RSUs (e.g., 25 RSUs) is deployed uniformly along roads, with the predefined transmission range (e.g., 150m). The total simulation time is 3000s.
B. Simulation Results of VANETs
First, we evaluate the V2V charging strategy for the high demand case in Section V, i.e., the number of discharging GEVs is less than the number of GEVs with charging demands (e.g., 8 GEVs with charging demands in this simulation setting). Fig. 3 shows both the discharging performance of supplying GEVs and the charging performance of GEVs with charging demands. Since the number of suppliers is less than the GEVs with charging demands, the price is first decided by suppliers via competition based on the Oligopoly game (i.e., (12) ) to maximize the discharging revenue for each supplier. It can be observed that the total (dis)charging power increases with the increased number of supplied GEVs, and the discharging revenues decrease with the increased supplied power due to the decreased price. Besides, the total discharging power is equal to the total charging power. Furthermore, for GEVs with charging demands, with the increased supplied power, the charging cost first increases and then decreases. The reason is as follows, when the supplied power is very limited, e.g., only 2 supplying GEVs, the total available power is low, and thus the energy price is the highest. Increasing the supplied power a little bit (e.g., 3 supplying GEVs), the charging cost may increase first due to the increased total energy and the relatively high price. However, with more power supply (e.g., 5 supplying GEVs), the energy price is much decreased, leading to the decreased costs. 4 shows the (dis)charging performances for the supply surplus case in Section V, i.e., the number of discharging GEVs is no less than the GEVs with charging demands (e.g., 8 supplying GEVs in this simulation setting). Firstly, the total charing power is still equal to the total discharging power at the swapping station. The charging cost decreases with the increased total charging power due to the decreased energy price. Moreover, the discharging revenues decrease with the increased total charging power due to the reduced energy price.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have developed a semi-distributed V2V charging strategy for GEVs at the swapping station. Real-time information delivery for the V2V strategy is provided through a heterogeneous wireless network by integrating both VANETs and cellular network. The proposed V2V (dis)charging strategy can maximize discharging revenues and minimize the charging costs, by means of Oligopoly game and Lagrange duality optimization techniques. Simulations results are presented to demonstrate the performances of the proposed V2V charging strategy. In our future work, we intend to collect large-scale real-world vehicle traffic traces, to further validate the benefits of the proposed strategy in practical scenarios.
